Taiwan Is Watching Ukraine - Why the West Can’t Afford Another Georgia

In her recent article “Georgia’s Warning for Ukraine,” former Georgian Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili outlines the dangerous consequences of a cease-fire unaccompanied by long-term security guarantees. Her country, once hailed as a democratic success story, has become a cautionary tale. After Russia’s 2008 invasion, the West opted to reset relations with Moscow rather than impose real costs. Georgia was left vulnerable, its territory fractured, its democratic institutions slowly co-opted, and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations indefinitely stalled.

This story is deeply familiar to observers in Taiwan. The dynamics Tkeshelashvili describes—military intimidation, creeping influence, the erosion of sovereignty through gray-zone operations—are not limited to Georgia or Ukraine. They are part of a wider authoritarian strategy, one that stretches across Eurasia to the Indo-Pacific. If the West fails to learn from Georgia, and if it abandons Ukraine to a frozen conflict or a half-peace, it will send a clear message to authoritarian powers worldwide: coercion works, and the democracies they target will stand alone.

THE STRATEGY OF AMBIGUITY

Georgia in 2008 was, like Ukraine in 2022 and Taiwan today, a democracy aligned with the West but lacking firm security guarantees. The Bucharest NATO summit that year promised eventual membership for Georgia and Ukraine, but withheld immediate action. The result was strategic ambiguity—an invitation, as it turned out, to Russian intervention.

The parallels to Taiwan are striking. For decades, Taiwan has operated in a state of formal diplomatic limbo, protected by ambiguous U.S. commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act but excluded from major international institutions and security frameworks. It is, in effect, another case of geopolitical hedging: praised rhetorically, supported economically, but denied clear assurances.

That ambiguity, once seen as stabilizing, now risks emboldening adversaries. Just as Moscow tested the limits of Western tolerance in Georgia and Ukraine, Beijing has steadily expanded its campaign of pressure on Taiwan—through air and naval encirclement, cyberattacks, economic coercion, and disinformation. Each action is calibrated to avoid triggering a full-scale response while slowly reshaping the balance of power.

CEASE-FIRE AS STRATEGIC PAUSE

Tkeshelashvili’s central argument is that a cease-fire without follow-through merely provides aggressors with a “tactical pause.” That is precisely how Moscow treated the 2008 cease-fire with Georgia: not as the end of hostilities but as a platform from which to consolidate territorial control and cultivate proxy political influence. Within a few years, Georgia’s democratic trajectory had been derailed from within.

If the current U.S. administration pushes Ukraine toward a cease-fire without anchoring it in a larger strategic framework, the results could be even more destabilizing. A freeze on the front lines would effectively legitimize Russia’s territorial gains. Without NATO integration or robust security guarantees, Ukraine could face the same long-term fate as Georgia: democratic backsliding, elite capture, and creeping authoritarian alignment.

Such a precedent would have immediate consequences for Taiwan. Beijing is watching not just how the war ends, but how the international system responds. If Ukraine is left vulnerable and isolated after enormous sacrifice, Taiwan’s deterrence will weaken. Conversely, a Ukrainian victory—political as much as military—would bolster confidence in democratic resilience across the Indo-Pacific.

A FREE WORLD DIVIDED

Tkeshelashvili rightly criticizes the failure of Western governments to match rhetorical support with strategic commitment. In Georgia’s case, the return to “business as usual” with Moscow came swiftly: energy deals resumed, defense cooperation was shelved, and the NATO accession process stagnated. Democratic institutions were left unsupported, making them easy prey for authoritarian interference.

Taiwan faces a similar structural imbalance. Its exclusion from multilateral institutions and defense alliances leaves it exposed to political warfare and diplomatic isolation. The lesson from Georgia is not just about military deterrence, but about the slow corrosion of democratic sovereignty in the absence of sustained international reinforcement.

In recent years, Taiwan has worked to diversify its economy, deepen ties with like-minded partners, and strengthen civil society resilience. But absent more concrete integration into the international liberal order—whether through trade pacts, security dialogues, or structured deterrence planning—those efforts risk being undermined by an adversary whose strategy is long-term, layered, and patient.

THE STAKES BEYOND EUROPE

The war in Ukraine is often discussed in regional terms: a threat to European security, an affront to NATO, a challenge for transatlantic diplomacy. But it is increasingly clear that its implications are global. For Taiwan, it represents a test case. If the West is unable to support and sustain a democracy resisting invasion in Europe, what confidence can others have in its willingness to do so in Asia?

The lesson from Georgia is not merely that Western inaction emboldens autocrats. It is that the appearance of unity without the substance of strategy leads to long-term regression. Taiwan, like Ukraine, stands at the front line of the authoritarian push against liberal order. Its fate depends not only on its own resilience, but on the coherence and consistency of the democratic world.

A cease-fire in Ukraine that fails to include a concrete path toward NATO integration, institutional reform, economic reconstruction, and deterrence will be seen not as a resolution, but as abandonment. That would be a gift to the Kremlin—and a green light to Beijing.