China’s Four Strategic Beachheads for “Lebanonizing” Taiwan

By Lōa Tiong-kiông (賴中強)

China is no longer waiting for a change in Taiwan’s presidency to achieve its political aims. Instead, it is actively pursuing a strategy to paralyze Taiwan’s democratic institutions from the periphery inward—a strategy I call the “Lebanonization” of Taiwan.

This approach is unfolding across four key beachheads: Taiwan’s offshore islands, the eastern regions of Hualien and Taitung, Indigenous communities, and local governments through fiscal decentralization. Together, they form the foundation of a new kind of influence operation aimed at weakening the authority of the central government.

What Is “Lebanonization”?

In 2016, China's state-run Global Times published an editorial warning the U.S. not to underestimate China’s resolve over Taiwan. It stated explicitly: “We must be capable of ‘Lebanonizing’ Taiwan if necessary, and make full military reunification a realistic option.”

The reference to Lebanon is no accident. Much like how Iran built its influence in Lebanon by backing Hezbollah in the Beqaa Valley, China is creating its own political enclaves in Taiwan—areas of high dependency and potential allegiance—that could serve to paralyze the national government from within.

The Four Beachheads of Influence

1. Offshore Islands (Kinmen and Matsu)

China has long targeted Kinmen and Matsu as gateways for “peaceful integration.” Since Xi Jinping’s 2019 “One Country, Two Systems for Taiwan” speech, Beijing has promoted direct infrastructure links—water, electricity, gas, and bridges—with China’s Fujian Province.

In 2023, Beijing escalated this by naming Fujian a “cross-Strait integration demonstration zone,” effectively turning Kinmen and Matsu into political laboratories for future integration with Taiwan.

2. Eastern Taiwan (Hualien and Taitung)

Hualien and Taitung, long marginalized in Taiwan’s development planning, have now become fertile ground for China-friendly initiatives. The so-called “Three Hualien-Taitung Transportation Acts” push for lavish infrastructure investments, raising concerns that these are less about genuine development and more about vote-buying and faction-building.

3. Indigenous Regions

Legislative amendments to the Organic Law of the Council of Indigenous Peoples aim to transfer appointment powers from the central government to potentially friendly local figures, giving Beijing-aligned politicians more influence over Indigenous policy and representation.

4. Local Government Finance

Perhaps the most critical: proposed amendments to the Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure Distribution Act would dramatically shift resources from the central government to local governments. One proposed version would slash over NT$375 billion (approx. US$11.5 billion) from central revenues.

Notably, the motion to fast-track this bill through committee was led by Kinmen legislator Chen Yu-jen—one of Beijing’s most vocal supporters in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan.

The Rise of the “Fu Kun-chi Bloc”

Following a 2023 visit to China by 18 legislators, a new pro-Beijing faction has emerged within Taiwan’s opposition: the “Fu Kun-chi Group,” named after the Hualien legislator and former county magistrate. Its key figures include:

- Fu Kun-chi (Hualien)
- Chen Yu-jen (Kinmen)
- Kao Chin Su-mei (Indigenous)
- Wang Hung-wei (Taipei, former New Party member)

Together, they now occupy central leadership roles in the legislature and are pushing forward policies that undermine the central government’s fiscal and political coherence.

This marks a sharp break from traditional Kuomintang (KMT) anti-Communist orthodoxy. Even Ma Ying-jeou-era officials such as former party secretary-general King Pu-tsung would be surprised to see the KMT’s current direction under Chairman Eric Chu.

Why This Matters: Lessons from Chinese Communist Party History

To understand this strategy, one must look at the Chinese Communist Party's own revolutionary history. The CCP won the Chinese Civil War not through a frontal assault on major cities, but by building “liberated zones” in rural areas—Jinggangshan, Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia, and others—that grew from small base areas into power centers.

This “encirclement of cities from the countryside” is the same logic now applied to Taiwan: build influence zones, weaken the national center, and expand outward. The ultimate goal is not just integration—but political paralysis.

Final Warning: Kinmen Is Not Just Kinmen

Many Taiwanese still say, “Let Kinmen go its own way.” But Kinmen is not just Kinmen—just as the Beqaa Valley was not just a valley. It became Iran’s launchpad to reshape Lebanese politics.

If Taiwan fails to recognize and resist these strategic maneuvers—particularly the fiscal and legal engineering taking place under our noses—we may wake up to a divided island, with pockets of political allegiance drifting steadily toward Beijing.

To defend Taiwan’s sovereignty today requires not just resisting external military threats, but also safeguarding the integrity of our domestic institutions from within..


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